New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Trade - Manatū Aorere. New Zealand Customs Service - Te Mana Arai o Aoteroa

Frequently asked questions

NZ Customs Service staff.

NZ Customs Service staff.


What is the Proliferation Security Initiative?

The Proliferation Security Initiative is an international effort involving more than 90 countries aimed at preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and related materials. The Proliferation Security Initiative complements other national and international non-proliferation efforts, including the work of the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) and the OPCW (Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons).

Unlike some other international efforts, the Proliferation Security Initiative has no formal structure, headquarters or chairperson.

What are weapons of mass destruction?

There is no universally accepted definition of 'weapons of mass destruction' but the term is generally used to refer to chemical, biological or nuclear weapons and technologies.

What is the Statement of Interdiction Principles?

The Statement of Interdiction Principles sets out practical steps for countries to work together to impede and stop shipments of weapons of mass destruction and related materials from reaching countries and groups of proliferation concern. All Proliferation Security Initiative participants have endorsed the Statement of Principles and encourage other countries to do so publicly.

What international endorsement has the Proliferation Security Initiative received?

As at June 2008, over 90 countries have expressed support for the Proliferation Security Initiative. Click here for the full list of Proliferation Security Initiative countries.

The UN has expressed support for the Proliferation Security Initiative, and the Proliferation Security Initiative helps implement UN Security Council Resolution 1540, which calls on countries to "take cooperative action to prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear, chemical or biological weapons".

What has the Proliferation Security Initiative achieved since its inception?

Interdiction (boarding) operations, by their very nature, are not generally publicised. However Proliferation Security Initiative partners have cooperated on several successful interdictions of weapons of mass destruction since the inception of the initiative.

For example, Proliferation Security Initiative cooperation has stopped the transhipment of material bound for WMD and ballistic missile programmes in countries of proliferation concern, including Iran, North Korea and Syria.

It is inevitable that much of this work is done quietly and with cooperation in sensitive channels outside the public spotlight. Discreet actions help partners stay one step ahead of the proliferators and give them less insight into steps they can take to evade detection.

Ongoing Proliferation Security Initiative training exercises and regular OEG (Operational Experts Group) meetings ensure Proliferation Security Initiative partners are well versed in sharing information and acting collaboratively to lawfully interdict illicit shipments of weapons of mass destruction and related materials.

What can countries do to contribute to the Proliferation Security Initiative?

States are encouraged to:

  • Endorse the Proliferation Security Initiative and its Statement of Interdiction Principles, and be willing to take all steps available to support Proliferation Security Initiative efforts.
  • Undertake a review and provide information on current national legal authorities to undertake interdictions (boardings) at sea, in the air or on land. Be willing to strengthen authorities where appropriate.
  • Identify specific national assets that might contribute to Proliferation Security Initiative efforts (eg, information sharing, military and/or law enforcement assets).
  • Provide points of contact for Proliferation Security Initiative interdiction requests and other operational activities. Establish appropriate internal government processes to coordinate Proliferation Security Initiative response efforts.
  • Be willing to actively participate in Proliferation Security Initiative interdiction training exercises and actual operations as opportunities arise.
  • Be willing to consider signing relevant agreements (e.g., boarding agreements) or to otherwise establish a concrete basis for cooperation with Proliferation Security Initiative efforts.
  • It is understood that countries' actual involvement in Proliferation Security Initiative activities, exercises, or meetings will differ, depending on each country's respective capabilities and situation. However, it is expected that states participating in the Proliferation Security Initiative will evaluate their capabilities and strengths to determine their best means of support for the initiative.


What is the Operational Experts Group (OEG)?

The Operational Experts Group (OEG) is the main coordination body of the Proliferation Security Initiative. The OEG discusses upcoming and completed Proliferation Security Initiative activities, especially Proliferation Security Initiative exercises, trafficking issues and industry outreach, along with the operational, legal and information-exchange elements of the Proliferation Security Initiative.

Twenty countries form the OEG. Members as at June 2008 are Argentina, Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Singapore, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States.

Is there a blacklist of states of concern?

No. The Proliferation Security Initiative aims to prevent trafficking of weapons of mass destruction by any country or non-state actor (eg terrorist group) that engages in or supports weapons of mass destruction proliferation, in any place, at any time.

What are dual-use items?

Dual-use goods have primarily legitimate civilian and commercial uses in the pharmaceutical, chemical, biotechnology, engineering and other high-tech industries but can also be used in military applications, whether in conventional weapons systems or for the development of weapons of mass destruction. Many dual-use items are traded widely and their misuse for military purposes can be hidden within civil activities. Examples include:

  • heat-resistant composite materials used in oven doors can be used in missiles, to protect them as they re-enter the Earth's atmosphere
  • freeze-drying equipment used to cultivate germs can be used in legitimate laboratories and in the manufacture of biological weapons
  • controlling flash lamps that generate high power radar pulses are used in high-speed photography, industrial photochemistry and can also be used to break up kidney stones: they can also be used to detonate a nuclear device.


What are strategic goods or goods of proliferation concern?

Strategic goods include dual-use goods (see above question) and goods designed specifically for military use, including weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles.

Different countries implement differing export controls on these items but all UN member states must respect UN sanctions. In New Zealand, these goods are controlled through the New Zealand Strategic Goods List.

What is Exercise Maru?

Exercise Maru is the next Proliferation Security Initiative exercise and will include both desktop and 'live' scenarios involving intercepting weapons of mass destruction or dual-use items. Proliferation Security Initiative countries will test their responses to these situations, sharing information and ensuring their responses are consistent with both domestic and international law.

The exercise will be hosted by New Zealand Customs Service, in conjunction with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the New Zealand Defence Force, and the Ministry of Defence, and will be held in Auckland from 15-19 September 2008.

How are Proliferation Security Initiative efforts funded?

Participating countries are required to fund their own efforts in support of the Proliferation Security Initiative.

What is the relationship between Proliferation Security Initiative and formal non-proliferation structures?

The Proliferation Security Initiative is an activity, not an organisation. Proliferation Security Initiative activities are consistent with national legal authorities and international law and frameworks, many of which, in turn, implement existing non-proliferation structures.

PSI builds on existing non-proliferation and export control regime efforts to identify and prevent the export of certain commodities to weapons of mass destruction and missile programmes of proliferation concern.

How does the Proliferation Security Initiative relate to the UN and other non-proliferation regimes/treaties?

The Proliferation Security Initiative is not a formal organisation with a budget and headquarters, but rather a voluntary partnership between participating countries committed to taking steps consistent with national and international law to deter, disrupt and prevent weapons of mass destruction proliferation. There is broad international support for the Proliferation Security Initiative, including at the UN. It is noteworthy that the UN High-Level Panel recommended in its December 2004 Report to the Secretary General that all States should be encouraged to join this voluntary initiative. The Proliferation Security Initiative complements existing tools, including multilateral non-proliferation treaties and regimes, by providing an operational mechanism when proliferators seek to evade international rules.

When and how are operational activities planned for the future?

Proliferation Security Initiative operational activities - including training exercises and relevant workshops - evolve through discussions among operational experts. In general, training events are proposed at Operational Experts Group (OEG) meetings and an exercise schedule that maximizes sustained participation is developed on a two-year horizon.

Is technical assistance provided to countries that currently lack capabilities to contribute fully to Proliferation Security Initiative efforts?

There are no formal mechanisms within the Proliferation Security Initiative for the provision of technical assistance to countries to improve their capabilities to support Proliferation Security Initiative actions, but this can be pursued bilaterally as well as through the involvement of PSI participants at global and regional meetings, including exercises such as Exercise Maru.